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ABSTRACT
This paper consolidates the work of its predecessor, “International Framework for Liquidity 
Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring: Corporate Governance and Internal Controls”, 
by considering monitoring tools which are considered to be essential if risks,(and in particular 
liquidity risks which are attributed to a bank), are to be managed and measured effectively by 
its management. It also considers developments which have triggered the need for particular 
monitoring tools – not only in relation to liquidity risks, but also to the rise of conglomerates 
and consolidated undertakings. It highlights weaknesses in financial supervision – weaknesses 
which were revealed following the collapses of Barings and Lehman Brothers. As well as 
attempting  to  draw comparisons  between  the  recommendations  which  were  made  by  the 
Board of Banking Supervision (BoBS) following Barings’ collapse, and the application issues 
raised by the Basel Committee in its 2009 Consultative Document, International Framework 
for  Liquidity  Risk  Measurement,  Standards  and  Monitoring,  it  highlights  the  links  and 
relevance between both recommendations.
In  drawing  attention  to  the  significance  of  corporate  governance,  audit  committees,  and 
supervisory boards, the importance of effective communication between management at all 
levels,  to  ensure  transmission  and  communication  of  timely,  accurate  and  complete 
information, is also highlighted. Through a comparative analysis of two contrasting corporate 
governance systems, namely, Germany and the UK, it analyses and evaluates how the design 
of corporate governance systems could influence transparency, disclosure, as well as higher 
levels of monitoring and accountability.
Whilst  highlighting  the  need  for,  and  the  growing  importance  of  formal  risk  assessment 
models, the paper also emphasises the dangers inherent in formalism – as illustrated by a rules 
based  approach  to  regulation.  It  will  however,  demonstrate  that  detailed  rules  could  still 
operate within a system of principles based regulation – whilst enabling a consideration of the 
substance of the transactions which are involved. In addressing the issues raised by principles 
based regulation, the extent to which such issues can be resolved, to a large extent, depends 
on adequate compliance with Basel Core Principle 17 (for effective banking supervision) – 
and particularly on the implementation, design and compliance with “clear arrangements for 
delegating authority and responsibility.”
Key Words: liquidity; principles based regulation; risks; corporate governance; audit; creative 
compliance
Risk Monitoring Tools in Bank Regulation and Supervision – Developments 
Since the Collapse of Barings Plc.
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
The  Basel  Committee’s  recent  focus  is  reflected  through  its  goals  of  intensifying  the 
“resilience of internationally active banks to liquidity stresses”, as well as the intensification 
of  international  harmonisation  of  liquidity  risk  supervision.  These  efforts  are  aimed  at 
consolidating recent work which culminated in the issue of the Principles for Sound Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervision.
As part of measures aimed at facilitating “further consolidation and promotion of consistency 
in international liquidity risk supervision”, and in response to the “inaccurate and ineffective 
management of liquidity risk” – such ineffective management being a prominent feature of 
the Financial Crisis, the Basel Committee has developed a minimum set of monitoring tools 
to  be  used  in  the  “ongoing  monitoring  of  the  liquidity  risk  exposures  of  cross  border 
institutions and in communicating these exposures amongst home and host supervisors.”2
In  considering  the  topics  of  discussion,  the  ensuing  section  of  this  paper  (after  the 
introductory section) will be dedicated to developments which have triggered the need for 
particular  monitoring  tools  -  both in  response to  global  developments  and with particular 
reference to the ever increasing prominence of liquidity risks. Section three will then consider 
why there is greater need for enhanced disclosure requirements, as well as the need for greater 
reliance on disclosure requirements.  Furthermore, it highlights the role played by enhanced 
disclosure requirements in facilitating the monitoring of risks. Disclosure and transparency 
should be enhanced if the communication of liquidity risk exposures are to be effective. 
The  importance  of  effectively  managing  internal  controls  will  constitute  the  focus  of 
discussion under section four. This will be considered against the background of failures and 
weaknesses  in  banks’  internal  controls  and  management  systems  –  as  illustrated  by  the 
collapse of Barings. As well as highlighting the contribution of corporate governance to an 
effective system of internal controls, section five will consider the role played by corporate 
governance in aggravating the effects of systemic and liquidity risks. 
Good corporate governance would “provide proper incentives for the board and management 
to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders.”3 The dual 
faceted aspects of corporate governance relate not only to the accountability of management 
to  shareholders,  but  also  to  the  supervision  and monitoring  of  management  performance. 
Good corporate governance should facilitate effective monitoring, effective management of 
internal controls and risks, effective disclosure and transparency.
1Researcher, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen, Teaching Associate Oxford 
Brookes University, Oxford.
2 See Consultative Document „International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring at page 2
3 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 
February 2006 at page 4
Under section six, a comparison will then be undertaken between the application issues for 
standards  and monitoring  tools and the recommendations  made by the Board of  Banking 
Supervision  following  the  collapse  of  Barings.  Furthermore,  section  six  considers  the 
increased formalisation of procedures with risk assessment tools and the role played by the 
external auditor in implementing and utilising regulatory standards and monitoring tools. The 
need for such increased formalisation  with risk monitoring  tools  will  be analysed  against 
problems attributed to the formalisation of regulatory standards. Furthermore, off site and on 
site systems of supervision will  be analysed,  not only in relation to the external auditor’s 
involvement in the supervisory process, but also in relation to the suggestion that the use of 
formal risk assessment models will imply a need “to bring the line supervisors into direct 
contact , on site, with a wider range of management.”
The role of audit committees as internal monitoring tools of corporate governance in the UK 
will then be analysed and compared with the two tier system of disclosure which exists in 
Germany. 
The final section of the paper will consider principles based regulation – within the context of 
compliance  and  enforcement,  and  also  within  the  context  of  monitoring.  The  theme 
“substance  over  form”  draws  attention  to  creative  accounting  practices  and  the  need  for 
greater emphasis on principles based regulation. Creative accounting and “window dressing” 
of figures in the financial statements are ever recurring issues arising from corporate collapses 
– as also highlighted by the recent crises which involved Lehman Brothers.
Whilst  the  danger  of  formalism  lies  in  the  exercise  of  “creative  compliance”,4 inherent 
problems of anti formalism are considered to include the fact that:5
- Citizens have the right to know exactly what is prohibited in advance of behaviour 
rather than in retrospect
- Broad rules are imprecise and over inclusive
- Anti  formalism  could  result  in  ineffective  control  -  where  it  is  impossible  to 
implement
Principles based regulation (PBR) is more advantageous than a rules based approach – owing 
to the fact  that  off balance6 sheet  debt could result  from the direct  application of rules – 
without being able to consider the substance of the transaction and because the implemented 
standards or rules do not allow such consideration. As its secondary argument7, this paper will 
seek to demonstrate that detailed rules could still operate within a system of principles based 
regulation – whilst enabling a consideration of the substance of the transactions which are 
involved.
Regulatory standards implemented by the Basel Committee in its recent document8 provide 
for “jurisdiction-specific  conditions” – for example,  the percentage of potential  run-off of 
4 Creative compliance being the use of rules to escape control without actually violating those rules
5 V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About  (ICAEW) 
2001 at page 11
6 Off balance sheet items are obligations which are contingent liabilities of a company/bank – and which as a 
result, do not appear on its balance sheet. Formal distinction between on and off balance sheet items, even 
though sometimes detailed, depend to an extent on the degree of judgement which is exercised by management.
7 The primary theme being the importance of successfully communicating results obtained from monitoring and 
measuring such risks, and the role of corporate governance in ensuring such effective communication.
8  See Consultative Document, „International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring“ at page 2
retail  deposits  which  is  partially  dependent  on  the  structure  of  a  jurisdiction’s  deposit 
insurance  scheme.”9 Furthermore,  the  Committee  highlights  that  “in  these  cases,  the 
parameters  should  be  transparent  and  clearly  outlined  in  the  regulations  of  each 
jurisdiction.”10 It also adds that this would provide clarity both within the jurisdiction as well 
as across borders concerning  the precise  parameters  that  the banks are  capturing in these 
metrics, and that there was need for public disclosures in respect of regulatory standards.11
The  ever  growing  prominence  and  importance  of  liquidity  in  prudential  supervision 
constitutes  a vital  reason which justifies  the need for a prudential  supervisory framework 
which does not merely (and excessively) rely on capital adequacy requirements within such a 
framework.
Paragraph  56  of  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision’s  Principles  for  Sound 
Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision states that: 
“A bank should  have  a  reliable  management  information  system designed to  provide  the 
board  of  directors,  senior  management  and  other  appropriate  personnel  with  timely  and 
forward-looking  information  on  the  liquidity  position  of  the  bank.  The  management 
information  system  should  have  the  ability  to  calculate  liquidity  positions  in  all  of  the 
currencies in which the bank conducts business – both on a subsidiary/branch basis in all 
jurisdictions in which the bank is active and on an aggregate group basis. It should capture all 
sources of liquidity risk, including contingent risks and the related triggers and those arising 
from  new  activities,  and  have  the  ability  to  deliver  more  granular  and  time  sensitive 
information  during  stress  events.  To  effectively  manage  and  monitor  its  net  funding 
requirements, a bank should have the ability to calculate liquidity positions on an intraday 
basis, on a day-to-day basis for the shorter time horizons, and over a series of more distant 
time periods thereafter. The management information system should be used in day-to-day
liquidity  risk  management  to  monitor  compliance  with  the  bank’s  established  policies, 
procedures and limits.”12
B. Developments  Since  the  Collapse  of  Barings  and  Events  Culminating  in  the 
Introduction of Present Tools for Liquidity Risk Measurements
In February 2008,  the Basel  Committee  on Banking Supervision  published a  paper  titled 
“Liquidity Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges”, a paper which highlighted the fact 
that many banks had ignored the application of a number of basic principles of liquidity risk 
9 ibid
10 ibid
11 ibid
12 Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  Supervision   Sept  2008  at  page  17 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm> Furthermore,  paragraph  57 highlights  the importance of  a consensus 
between  senior  management  in  relation  to  a  set  of  reporting  criteria  aimed  at  facilitating  liquidity  risk 
monitoring. Such reporting criteria should specify ““the scope, manner and frequency of reporting for various 
recipients (such as the board, senior management, asset – liability committee) and the parties responsible for 
preparing the reports.” “Reporting of risk measures should be done on a frequent basis (eg daily reporting for 
those responsible for managing liquidity risk, and at each board meeting during normal times, with reporting 
increasing in times of stress) and should compare current liquidity exposures to established limits to identify any 
emerging pressures and limit breaches. Breaches in liquidity risk limits should be reported and thresholds and 
reporting  guidelines  should  be  specified  for  escalation  to  higher  levels  of  management,  the  board  and 
supervisory authorities.” 
management during periods of abundant liquidity.13 An extensive review of its 2000 “Sound 
Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking Organisations” was also carried out by the Basel 
Committee as a means of addressing matters and issues arising from the financial markets and 
lessons  from the  Financial  Crises.14 In  order  to  consolidate  on  the  Basel  Committee  for 
Banking Supervision’s  Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of 
September 2008, which should lead to improved management and supervision of liquidity 
risks of individual banks, supervisory bodies will be required “ to develop tools and policies 
to address the pro cyclical behaviour of liquidity at the aggregate level”.15
The Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008 are 
aimed  at  providing  “consistent  supervisory  expectations”  on  principal  elements  such  as 
“board and senior management oversight; the establishment of policies and risk tolerance; the 
use of liquidity risk management tools such as comprehensive cash flow forecasting, limits 
and  liquidity  scenario  stress  testing;  and  the  maintenance  of  a  sufficient  cushion  of  high 
quality liquid assets to address contingent liquidity needs.”16
The link between liquidity and systemic risks as illustrated in the ECB’s Financial Stability 
Review, is attributed to the “destruction of specific knowledge17 which banks have about their
borrowers and the reduction of the common pool of liquidity.”18 The importance of the link 
between liquidity risks and systemic risks within the banking sector is  highlighted by the 
consequences  attributed  to  the  reluctance  of  banks  to  retain  liquidity  -  given  the  cost  of 
holding liquidity.19 The consequential shortfalls of liquidity as reflected by on and off balance 
sheet maturity mismatches accentuates the importance of the role assumed by central banks in 
the funding of bank balance sheets.20
The link between liquidity and systemic risks is also accentuated under paragraph 77 of the 
BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008. 
Principle 8 states that:
“A bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment and 
settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed conditions and thus 
contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems.”
13 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
14 ibid
15 “The FSF proposes that the BCBS and CGFS develop a joint research effort to address funding and liquidity 
risk, starting in 2009. A key component of this research agenda is to define robust measures of funding and 
liquidity risk, which could assist assessments of liquidity risk by the private sector. Stress tests to gauge the 
probability and magnitude of a liquidity crisis in different market environments will be considered in this light.” 
For further information on this, see Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the 
Financial System: Measuring and Funding Liquidity Risk” 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
16 See Bank for International Settlements, Consultative Document “International Framework for Liquidity Risk, 
Measurement Standards and Monitoring” at page 1
17Since specific knowledge which banks possess about their borrowers is considered to be a factor which determines 
the illiquidity of bank loans; see “The Concept of Systemic Risk” ECB Financial Stability Review December 2009 at 
page 137 <http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?05d3164914c6a14bb13522
2b5c3894fa>
18ibid; According to the Review, the reduction in the common pool of liquidity also has the potential to trigger the 
failure of banks and could consequently lead to a devaluation of illiquid bank assets and further aggravation of 
problems within the banking sector.
19Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
20ibid
Paragraph  7721 elaborates  on  this  by  highlighting  the  reasons  why  “intraday  liquidity 
management” constitutes an important component of a bank’s “broader liquidity management 
strategy.”  It  goes on to state that  a bank’s failure to manage intraday liquidity effectively 
could result in its inability to meet payment obligations as they fall due, - hence generating 
consequences,  not  only  for  its  own  liquidity  position,  but  also  that  of  other  parties.  It 
illustrates how this could occur in two ways, namely: 
- “The fact that that counter parties may view the failure to settle payments when expected, 
as a sign of financial weakness – which in turn could result not only in payments to the 
bank being delayed or withheld, but also in further aggravation of liquidity pressures.
- It  also  could  leave  counterparties  unexpectedly  short  of  funds,  impair  those 
counterparties’ ability to meet payment obligations, and disrupt the smooth functioning of 
payment and settlement systems. Given the interdependencies that exist among systems, a 
bank’s failure to meet certain critical payments could lead to liquidity dislocations that 
cascade quickly across many systems and institutions. If risk controls are overwhelmed, 
these dislocations could alter many banks’ intraday or overnight funding needs, including 
their demands for central bank credit, and potentially affect conditions in money markets. 
The delay of other less critical payments also might cause other institutions to postpone 
their own payments, cause many banks to face increased uncertainty about their overnight 
funding needs and potentially increase the impact of any operational outages.”
The  growing  importance  of  formalisation  within  the  bank  regulatory  framework  is  also 
attributed to the gaps which exist within a discretionary based system of bank supervision – as 
was revealed in the aftermath of Baring Plc’s collapse. The recent crisis has also highlighted 
the need for formal  risk assessment  models  – as demonstrated  by the demise  of Lehman 
Brothers  where  the  failures  of  auditors  to  detect  balance  sheet  irregularities  (owing  to 
creative accounting practices) was brought to light.
The formal  framework for  the measurement  of capital  adequacy at  European Community 
level, as exemplified by the International Convergence of Capital Measurements and Capital 
Standards(Revised Framework), namely Basel 2, is to be commended, not only because of 
“the need for a  consistent  framework for  the reporting and comparative  analysis  of  bank 
capital  positions, the demand of regulated institutions for transparency and equality in the 
application of regulatory standards”, but also because of “the exigencies of the international 
convergence  process  –  which  requires  the  transparent  and  uniform  implementation  of 
harmonised rules by the regulators of every country.”22
As part  of  measures  aimed  at  consolidating  and  “promoting  consistency  in  international 
liquidity risk supervision”, and in response to the “inaccurate and ineffective management of 
liquidity risk” – as was prominently highlighted during the recent financial crisis, the Basel 
Committee has developed a “minimum set of monitoring tools to be used in the ongoing 
monitoring of the liquidity risk exposures of cross border institutions and in communicating 
these exposures amongst home and host supervisors.”23
21 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 at pages 20 and 21
22 See C Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England Lloyds of London Press 1995 at pages 
208-209
23 See Bank for International Settlements, Consultative Document “International Framework for Liquidity Risk, 
Measurement Standards and Monitoring” at page 2
The  Liquidity  Coverage  Ratio24 and  the  Net  Stable  Funding  Ratio25 are  two  regulatory 
standards for liquidity risk which serve the purpose of attaining the objectives of “promoting 
short-term resiliency of the liquidity risk profile of institutions” (by ensuring that they have 
adequate high quality liquid resources to survive during periods of extreme stress which last 
for  about  one  month)  and “promoting  resiliency  over  longer-term periods”  (  through the 
creation of additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of 
funding on an ongoing basis).26
In  addition  to  the  above-mentioned  standards,  the  Basel  Committee  recommends  that 
supervisors  also  implement  designated  monitoring  tools  on  a  consistent  basis.  Such 
monitoring  tools,  along  with  the  standards,  are  intended  to  provide  supervisors  with 
information  which  should aid their  assessment  of  liquidity  risks  attributed  to  a  particular 
bank.27 These monitoring  tools  include:  Contractual  Maturity  Mismatch,  Concentration  of 
Funding, Available Unencumbered Assets and Market – related monitoring tools.28
C. Disclosure 
As well  as the need for greater  focus on liquidity risk,  there  is  also the need for greater 
reliance on disclosure requirements. This will be facilitated through an effective monitoring 
process  whereby  identified  risks  are  effectively  communicated  across  all  levels  of 
management.
Enhanced transparency does not only have the potential to “improve an understanding of the 
mechanism at play in structured finance”, but also facilitate the identification of risks and 
ensure that  risks  are  well  controlled.  29 Risky loans  which were “repackaged and sold to 
institutional  investors” – some of whom did not fully comprehend the implications of the 
transactions  they  were  engaged  in  (or  about  to  be  engaged  in),  and  the  inherent  risks 
associated with those transactions, are considered to be contributory factors to the 2007/09 
Financial Crisis.30
Regulators will also be able to gain greater access to vital information which is required for 
effective performance of their functions where duties which are imposed on third parties, such 
as  external  auditors  (in  relation  to  the  disclosure  of  information  which  is  necessary  and 
required for the efficient performance of the regulators’ activities), are complied with – as 
opposed to a right to report.
The  relationship  between  supervisory  authorities  and  the  external  auditors  of  a  credit 
institution and the duties of these auditors was identified as an important  lesson from the 
24 This ratio „identifies the amount of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets an institution holds that can be 
used to offset the net cash outflows it would encounter under an acute short-term stress scenario by supervisors.“ 
ibid at page 3
25 This ratio measures “the amount of longer-term, stable sources of funding utilised by an institution relative to 
the liquidity profiles of the assets being funded and the potential for contingent calls on funding liquidity arising 
from off-balance sheet commitments and obligations.“ ibid
26 ibid
27 ibid at page 25
28 ibid
29 See speech by C McCreevy European Commissioner for Internal Market an Services at the European 
Parliament 11 Sept 2007 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/07/520&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
30 ibid
BCCI  case.31 Because  of  auditors’  access  to  financial  undertakings’  accounts  and  other 
essential documents and information, they assume a vital position in the overall supervisory 
process. An analysis of BCCI revealed that measures, additional to those already existing, 
needed  to  be  taken  to  eliminate  the  opaqueness  of  financial  structures  and  strengthen 
cooperation  between  all  bodies  or  persons  involved  in  the  supervision  of  such  complex 
financial structures.32
As a result, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision issued “minimum standards” which 
lay down rules for effective consolidated supervision and cooperation between supervisory 
authorities.  This  was  not  only  aimed  at  strengthening  international  co  operation  between 
prudential supervisors, but also to improve transparency of financial, and in particular, group 
structures.
D. The Importance of Effective Management of Internal Controls
“Banks  identified  as  having  control  problems  have  been  characterised  by  organisational 
structures in which responsibilities were not clearly defined: hence (1) No senior management 
monitored  the  performance  of  activities  (carried  out  within  the  organisation)  closely  to 
observe unusual activities 2) No senior management had a comprehensive understanding of 
the activities and how profits were being generated.”33
 
The  collapse  of  Barings  in  1995  which  was  attributed  not  only  to  lack  of  quality  and 
employee deception, also brought the issue of internal controls and management systems to 
the fore.34 Barings' collapse illustrated weaknesses in the bank regulator’s supervisory regime 
- which included flaws within its evaluation of internal controls at banks, flaws inherent in the 
internal communication within levels of management of the bank regulator, and weaknesses 
in the way the bank regulator’s existing rules were applied.35
The  need  for  improved  communication  at  all  levels  (and  also  between  all  levels)  of 
management,  as well as increased efficiency in the application and interpretation of rules, 
principles and procedures, will be considered particularly under the last-but-one section of 
this paper, under principles based regulation.
 The Basel Committee categorised into five groups, types of control breakdowns which are 
characteristic of ailing banks and these are as follows:36 
- Lack of  adequate  management  oversight  and accountability,  and  failure  to  develop  a 
strong control culture within the bank37
31 JF Mogg, ‚The Bank of England and the Development of Internal Control Systems’ in R Kinsella (ed) Internal 
Controls in Banking (Oak Tree Press Dublin 1995) at page 31
32 ibid at page 28
33 See “Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations”, Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision 1998 at page 27
34 Whilst it is contended by some that the problems attributed to Barings focussed round the lack of controls, the 
system of internal controls which operated were also considered by the regulator at the time (the Bank of 
England) to be informal but effective. See Barings Bank and International Regulation Volume 1 (12 December 
1006) at page xiii
35 See Treasury Committee, Barings Bank and International Regulation Report No 1 1996 page xv
36 See Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations, Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision 1998 at pages 6 and 7
37 In order to evaluate the quality of internal controls, supervisors could adopt a number of approaches which 
include i) the evaluation of the work of the internal audit department of the bank (through a review of its 
working papers – including the methodology implemented in identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling 
risks). ii) If supervisors are satisfied with the quality of the internal audit department’s work, they could use the 
reports of internal auditors as a primary mechanism for the identification of control problems in the bank (or for 
- Inadequate recognition and assessment of the risk of certain banking activities, whether 
on or off balance sheet
- The absence or failure  of key control  structures  and activities  such as segregation  of 
duties, approvals, verifications, reconciliations and reviews of operating performance
- Inadequate communication of information between levels of management within the bank 
–  particularly  the  communication  of  information  to  higher  ranked  officials  (senior 
management)
- Inadequate or ineffective audit programmes and monitoring activities
E. The Contribution of Corporate Governance to an Effective System of Internal Controls
Various  corporate  collapses  have  resulted  in  changes  to  financial  reporting,  corporate 
governance  and audit.38 The emphasis  on internal  controls  and risk management  emerged 
from the realisation that due to change in the business environment, even effective safeguards 
may be insufficient to eliminate all possibilities of failure.39
Keasy and Wright  define  corporate  governance  as  the “examination  of  the structures  and 
processes  associated  with  production,  decision  making,  control  and  so  on  within  an 
organisation.”40 The  two  aspects  of  governance  are  considered  to  be  i)  Supervision  and 
monitoring of management performance (the enterprise aspect) and ii) ensuring accountability 
of management to shareholders and other stakeholders (the accountability aspect).41
The feedback effects of corporate governance into the liquidity and systemic risk mechanisms 
are illustrated thus: 
“Poor corporate governance may contribute  to bank failures,  which could pose significant 
public  costs  and  consequences  due  to  their  potential  impact  on  any  applicable  deposit 
insurance  systems  and  the  possibility  of  broader  macro  economic  implications,  such  as 
contagion  risk and impact  on payments  systems.  Furthermore,  poor corporate  governance 
could result in markets losing confidence in the ability of a bank to properly manage its assets 
and liabilities, including deposits, which could in turn, trigger a bank run or liquidity crisis.”42
identifying areas of potential risk – areas which have not been recently reviewed by the auditors). iii)Further 
some supervisors may use a self-assessment process in which management reviews the internal controls on a 
business by business basis whilst  iv)other supervisors may require periodic external audits of key areas (given 
that supervisor defines the scope). Supervisors may ultimately combine one or more of the techniques 
highlighted under (i) - (iv) with own on site reviews or examinations of internal controls. See ibid at pages 22 
and 23
38 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation 
of public limited companies at page 17
39 ibid
40 See K Keasy and M Wright, ‘Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance: An Editorial’ Accounting 
and Business Research, 23 (91A) at page 291. OECD principles define corporate governance as involving “ a set 
of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders.” See 
Preamble to OECD Principles of Corporate Governance “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” 2004 at 
page 11 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf>.
41 V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About (ICAEW) 
2001 at page 26
42 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 
February 2006 at page 4
As well as a robust system of internal controls (which incorporates internal and external audit 
functions),  the  implementation  of  i)  corporate  values,  codes  of  conduct,  standards  of 
appropriate  behaviour  and the system used in ensuring compliance  with these,  ii)  a clear 
allocation  of  responsibilities  and  decision  making  authorities,  iii)  the  establishment  of  a 
system which would guarantee efficient interaction and collaboration between the board of 
directors, senior management and auditors, and iv) special monitoring of risk exposures where 
conflicts of interest are likely to be high, are considered to be crucial to ensuring that sound 
corporate governance operates within an organisation.43
Furthermore, sound corporate governance practices are considered to require “ appropriate 
and effective legal, regulatory and institutional foundations.”44 Even though factors such as 
the system of business laws and accounting standards which prevail in respective jurisdictions 
are  considered  to be factors  which operate  beyond the scope of banking  supervision,  the 
inclusion of four important forms of oversight are considered sufficient not only in ensuring 
that  appropriate  checks  and  balances  exist,  but  that  an  effective  system  of  corporate 
governance can be achieved.45 The types of oversight include: 
“(1) oversight by the board of directors or supervisory board; (2) oversight by individuals not 
involved in the day-to-day running of the various business areas; (3) direct line supervision of 
different  business  areas;  and  (4)  independent  risk  management,  compliance  and  audit 
functions. In addition, it is important that key personnel are fit and proper for their jobs. “46
The contribution and the role assumed by senior management in ensuring that internal control 
systems are effectively managed, is reflected through the Principles for the Assessment of 
Internal Control Systems.47 The importance of monitoring and the rectification of deficiencies 
within internal control systems is reflected under principles 10-12.48 Principle 10 highlights 
the importance of monitoring on a frequent and ongoing basis whilst principles 11 and 12 
draw  attention  to  the  importance  of  effective  collaboration  and  communication  between 
highly  trained  competent  staff,  the  board  of  directors,  audit  committees  and  senior 
management.49
According to paragraph 84 of the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and
Supervision  of September 2008, internal coordination across business lines is vital towards 
ensuring that effective controls over liquidity outflows are achieved.50 In relation to examples 
of actions which supervisors could adopt as means of responding to banks with liquidity risk 
management weaknesses or excessive liquidity risk, that which “requires actions by the bank 
to  strengthen its  management  of  liquidity  risk  through improvements  in  internal  policies, 
controls or reporting to senior management and the board” is considered to have the greatest 
43 Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “ Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 
1999 at page 4
44 Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “ Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 
2006 at page 5
45 ibid
46 ibid
47 See particularly Principles 1-3 which relate to management oversight and the control culture; ibid at pages 2 
and 3
48 ibid at page 4
49 ibid at pages 4 and 5
50 Paragraph 16, as well as other sections which address and relate to internal and risk controls in particular, are 
considered to have the greatest importance out of all the sections within the BCBS Principles for Sound 
Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008
potential to address deficiencies in a bank’s liquidity risk management process or liquidity 
position.51
As  observed  by  the  Basel  Committee,52 “most  banks  that  have  experienced  losses  from 
internal control problems did not effectively monitor their internal control systems. Often the 
systems did not have the necessary built-in ongoing monitoring processes and the separate 
evaluations  performed  were  either  not  adequate  or  were  not  acted  upon appropriately  by 
management.”53 Furthermore it highlights that such failures to monitor adequately commence 
with a “failure to consider and react to day-to-day information provided to line management 
and other personnel indicating unusual activity – such as exceeded exposure limits, customer 
accounts  in  proprietary  business  activities  or  lack  of  current  financial  statements  from 
borrowers.”54
F. Comparative Analysis between Application Issues for Standards and Monitoring Tools and 
Recommendations made by the BoBS following the collapse of Barings.
Following the collapse of Barings, recommendations55 which were made to the regulator56 
include:57 The need for a review of the scope of returns which were submitted to the regulator, 
the need for preparation of internal guidelines for bank regulator’s staff (during reviews of 
solo  consolidation)  -  in  respect  of  procedures  to  be  followed,  the  need  for  a  review  of 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) between the bank regulator  and other regulators 
involved in financial supervision.
It  was also recommended that the bank regulator  review the number and skills of staff  it 
considered was necessary for on site supervision. Further proposals extended to the regulator 
include an extension of its  involvement  in international  coordination  where possible  – by 
signing MOUs and involving non banking regulators, as well as its initiative of meeting the 
internal audit departments of banks.58
As well as the extension of the scope of reporting accountants’ reports59 – which was to be 
extended beyond banks and outside the national jurisdiction, the bank regulator was required 
to periodically require authorised institutions to extend reports commissioned into systems 
and controls to include the preparation and inputting of data in major overseas locations. The 
bank  regulator  was  also  required  to  extend  its  guidance  to  managers  in  relation  to  large 
exposures and to ensure that  it  understood the principal  elements  of the management  and 
control  structures  of  those  banking  groups  where  it  was  responsible  for  consolidated 
supervision.
Whilst  the  above  recommendations  focussed  on  the  scope  of  application  (whether  the 
application of particular procedures were to be extended to group and/or entity level and to 
51 See paragraph 142 of BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 
2008
52 See “Monitoring Activities and Correcting Deficiencies” Framework for Internal Controls in Banking 
Organisations, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1998 at page 30
53 See ibid at paragraph 10
54 See ibid at paragraph 11
55 Recommendations issued by  the Board of Banking Supervision  
56 The bank regulator during this period was the Bank of England
57 See Treasury Committee Barings Bank and International Regulation Report No 1 (1996)
58 Where the bank regulator was a consolidated supervisor, it was to extend such meetings to include the group 
internal audit function. It was also required to meet chairmen of audit committees where large incorporated 
institutions were involved.
59 At the time, these were section 39 reports
foreign  bank  branches),  the  application  issues  for  standards  and  monitoring  tools  –  as 
highlighted by the Basel Committee in its Consultative Document,60 focus on issues which 
include  i)  the  frequency  with  which  banks  calculate  and  report  metrics,  ii)  the  scope  of 
application of these metrics and iii)public disclosure.61 In relation to these issues, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision proposed that metrics should be used on an ongoing basis 
to help monitor and control liquidity risks.62 Furthermore, it stated that banks are not only 
expected to meet the requirements of the standards on a continuous basis, but that metrics 
should be calculated and reported at least monthly.63 In relation to the scope of application of 
the metrics, it was stipulated that “proposed standards and monitoring tools were to be applied 
to all internationally active banks on a consolidated basis”, as well as consistently.64 With 
particular  emphasis  on  standards,  the  need  for  transparency  and  public  disclosure  of 
information on the metrics was also highlighted.65
The Basel Committee’s observations in relation to the above mentioned application issues 
signify  a  growing  emphasis  on  disclosure,  transparency  as  well  as  the  need  for  greater 
frequency in relation to financial reporting. The financial environment which characterises the 
present global markets is one which embodies more complex risks than those which existed 
during the collapse of Barings Plc. Further, whilst emphasis was placed on internal controls 
and  consolidated  supervision (as  regards  Barings),  recurring problems in  recent  corporate 
collapses  relate  to  off  balance  sheet  instruments  and the  need  for  a  consideration  of  the 
substance of transactions (such creative compliance practices being related also to internal 
controls and consolidated supervision).
Although  the  Board  of  Banking  Supervision’s  recommendations  (post  Barings  collapse) 
focussed primarily on the extension of the scope of prudential  supervision to consolidated 
undertakings, the frequency of monitoring - along with public disclosure, are factors which 
necessitate the implementation of increased levels of monitoring, transparency and disclosure 
– particularly in this time and age of more complex risks and occurrences of rampant and rife 
practices of creative compliance.
G. The Role of the External Auditor in Implementing and Utilising Regulatory Standards and 
Monitoring Tools 
As  well  as  facilitating  accountability,  increased  formalisation  with  risk  assessment  tools 
would reduce possibilities of the regulator being “captured” by the regulated. However, more 
formalised procedures in the application of rules also has implications for the observation of 
“substance over form” transactions. Problems which ultimately resulted in Enron’s collapse 
were partly attributed to  a rules based approach to regulation  – such an approach having 
contributed to creative compliance.66
60 Consultation Document on International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring at page 31
61 Ibid; a fourth application issue which was also considered in the Consultation Document relates to currencies. 
However this will not be considered for the purposes of study within this paper.
62 ibid
63 „With the operational capacity to increase frequency to weekly or even daily stresses situations - at the 
discretion of the supervisor.” ibid
64 ibid
65 „Required disclosure for the standards are to be similar to the disclosure of capital positions.“ ibid
66„Enron aggressively employed special purpose entities (SPEs) which were not consolidated into Enron’s 
financial statements and were treated as arms length parties for the purposes of Enron recording income from its 
dealings with these entities. Consolidation of such an entity is required unless, amongst other considerations, an 
independent third party holds a majority of the outstanding voting interests in the entity and the third party equity 
investment is equal to at least three per cent of the SPE’s total assets.If one considers the application of a three 
Following  the  collapse  of  Barings  and  according  to  the  Bank  of  England’s  Review  of 
Supervision,67 the Arthur Andersen review (supported by the Bank’s Review of Supervision) 
suggested that the use of formal risk assessment models will imply a need “to bring the line 
supervisors into direct contact, on site, with a wider range of management.”68
In implementing the regulatory standards and monitoring tools which are highlighted by the 
Basel  Committee  in  its  consultative  document,69 a  supervisory  approach  which  not  only 
incorporates the expertise of external auditors, but which is also more inclined to an on site 
system based approach is recommended. In supporting this view, reference is made to lessons 
learned from the collapse of Barings where it was noted by the Treasury Committee that “it 
was due to the discretionary basis of the supervisor’s approach to supervision that there was 
limited ability to detect events at Barings.”70
The regulatory standards and monitoring tools set out in the BIS Consultative Document71 are 
therefore  supported  on  the  basis  of  their  ability  to  facilitate  a  more  formal  approach  to 
supervision  which  would  reduce  the  scope  for  flexibility  (scope  for  creative  accounting 
practices and “window dressing” of balance sheet figures) where an on – site approach to 
supervision is implemented. However, increased formalised procedures, coupled with on site 
supervision do not suffice in the efforts to combat practices related to “creative compliance”. 
The importance of implementing a system of supervision which accords due consideration to 
the substance of transactions will be considered in the penultimate section of this paper (under 
principles based regulation).
II. On site and Off site systems of supervision
Principle 21 of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision,  Supervisory reporting 
states that  “Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analysing prudential 
reports and statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means 
of independent verification of these reports,  through either on-site examinations or use of 
external experts.”
According  to  Vieten,72 bank regulation  has  followed  two trends,  namely:  supervision  has 
become increasingly formalized and dependent on quantitative tools, and secondly, regulatory 
duties are being pushed down a regulatory pyramid to include external auditors and to enlist 
the resources of regulatees.
External  auditors,  even  though  they  do  not  constitute  by  definition,  part  of  a  banking 
organisation, immensely impact the quality of internal controls “through their audit activities 
per cent bright line rule it quickly becomes apparent that a considerable amount of interpretative judgment is 
required in its application.“ See D Kershaw, „Evading Enron: Taking Principles Too Seriously in Accounting 
Regulation“ (2005) 68 (4) Modern Law Review 594-625 at page 616
67 July 1994 paragraph 14
68 See Treasury Committee Barings Bank and International Regulation Report No 1 (1996) at xiv
69 See Consultative Document ‚International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring December 2009
70 Treasury Committee Barings Bank and International Regulation Report No 1 (1996) at page xiv
71 Consultative Document ‚International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 
December 2009
72 See HR Vieten, „Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared: Capital Ratios, External Audit and 
Internal Controls“ (1997) at page 18
– which also includes discussions with management and recommendations for improvement 
to internal controls.”73 “External auditors provide an important feedback on the effectiveness 
of the internal control system.”74
Off  site  supervision  is  synonymous  with  monitoring  and  involves  the  regulator’s  use  of 
external auditors’ expertise. It also involves the receipt and analysis of financial statements 
and statistical returns submitted to the supervisors. Off site monitoring often has the benefits 
of being able to identify potential  problems, particularly during intervals  between on- site 
inspections,  thereby  providing  early  detection  and  acting  as  trigger  for  corrective  action 
before problems become more serious.75
On site work is usually done by the examination staff of the bank supervisory agency or 
commissioned by supervisors but may be undertaken by external auditors. Furthermore, it is 
contended  that  on-site  examinations  are  frequently  implemented  by  banking  supervisory 
authorities which posses the legal basis or other arrangements to direct the scope of the work 
carried out by external auditors.76
Ongoing  monitoring  is  contrasted  with  separate  evaluations.  It  is  highlighted  that  whilst 
ongoing  monitoring  activities  not  only  provide  the  advantage  of  “quickly  detecting  and 
correcting  deficiencies  in  the  system”,  but  are  also  most  effective  “when  the  system  of 
internal control is integrated into the operating environment and produces regular reports for 
review,” that separate evaluations usually detect problems “only after the fact.”77 However 
separate evaluations also offer the advantage of providing an organisation with “fresh and 
comprehensive” insight into the effectiveness of monitoring activities – such activities being 
undertaken by staff from different departments which include the business function, financial 
control and internal audit.78
H. The Efficiency of Internal and External Monitoring Devices as Tools for facilitating 
Accountability, Transparency and Disclosure.
I. An Evaluation of External and Internal Control Based Systems of Governance
This section of the paper aims to shed light on how the present and more external control 
based system of  corporate  governance  in  Germany could  respond to  criticisms  related  to 
transparency, monitoring and accountability. Furthermore, it will consider how and whether 
banks have a role to play in corporate governance – particularly towards facilitating greater 
levels of monitoring and accountability.
Audit committees are not only regarded as internal monitoring devices supportive of good 
corporate governance, but also considered to be mechanisms for ensuring that an appropriate 
73 Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations, page 25 Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 1998
74 ibid
75 See „The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks’ External Auditors January 2002 paragraph 40 
page 11 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf?noframes=1>
76 See Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations, Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision 1998 at page 23
77 ibid at page 20; Examples of ongoing monitoring include the review and approval of journal entries, 
management review and approval of exception reports; ibid
78 ibid
relationship exists between the auditor and the management whose financial statements are 
being audited.79 In contrast to the audit committee, a two tier system of disclosure exists in 
Germany – which was conceived as a management control function.80 As well as performing 
the role of preparing two mandatory reports ( an “internal long form report” – directed to the 
supervisory  board  and  management  and  an  “external  summarized  report”),  the 
Wirtschaftsprüfer is also introduced as an external expert who reports to the supervisory board 
on matters relating to the financial state of the company – since the board is not considered to 
be competent enough to form an adequate opinion in the absence of such external expert.81
The  typical  public  limited  liability  company  in  Germany  is  comprised  of  two  boards  of 
directors, namely:82 i) The supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) – which could be described as the 
equivalent  of  an  audit  committee  and  ii)  the  management  board  (Vorstand).  Whilst  the 
management board is responsible for conducting daily operations and is accountable to the 
supervisory board, the supervisory board maintains oversight over the management board, 
“having the power to appoint and dismiss members of the management board , and also to 
stipulate their salaries.”83
In  drawing  comparisons  between  the  German  and  British  corporate  governance  systems, 
Vieten is of the opinion that “it is also improbable that the Cadbury proposals can effectively 
curtail the powers of the dominant interested party , namely the management” and that audit 
committees may “constitute no more than symbols of control” – having due regard to the 
German system which “invests power in non executive directors by statute – failing to prevent 
scandals.”84
“The German corporate governance system is generally considered to be a standard example 
of an insider-controlled and stake holder-oriented system.”85 However, transformation from 
this classic and traditional “insider-controlled” system to a “modern capital market based and 
outsider controlled” system has been observed.86 The advantages of the traditional  insider 
systems were considered to include:87
- i) Its ability to enable management to take a longer-term perspective in its planning and 
strategies
- ii) As a result of the need to finalise incomplete and implicit  contracts,  it  offered the 
benefit of flexibility and created stronger incentives to undertake relationship- specific 
investments  than  a  market  based  and  purely  shareholder-oriented  outsider  control 
system.”
79 V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About (ICAEW) 
2001 at page 29
80 H R Vieten, ‘Auditing in Britain and Germany Compared : Professions, Knowledge and the State’ European 
Accounting Review at page 506
81 ibid
82 See G Gorton and F Schmid, ‘Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms’ NBER Working 
Paper 5453 1996 at page 28
83 ibid
84 H R Vieten, ‘Auditing in Britain and Germany Compared : Professions, Knowledge and the State’ European 
Accounting Review at pages 506 and 507; In Vieten’s view, no proof has been provided to suggest that audit 
committees may improve corporate governance and audit independence; see ibid at page 506
85 See RH Schmidt, „Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective“ 2003 page 2 of 44
86 ibid at page 22 of 44
87 ibid at page 18 of 44
Identified weaknesses of the system include criticism that: “The supervisory board does not 
function in the way it  was intended to function.”88 As well  as the reliance  of the insider 
control  system on  informal  contracting  being  considered  to  have  contributed  to  “lack  of 
transparency”  and its anti  competitive effects”,  “a systematic  neglect  of the stock market, 
greater opportunities for abuse of power, the real danger that such as system is inimical to all 
reforms – even those which might improve its functioning without altering its fundamental 
structure,” are further criticisms attributed to an insider control system.89
II. Facilitating and Fostering Greater Frequency of Monitoring Procedures: The role of 
independent external experts in corporate governance
This section aims to demonstrate how corporate governance systems could facilitate higher 
levels of monitoring. 
The German system of corporate governance is distinguished from that which operates in 
Anglo Saxon countries owing to its incorporation of lenders and employees in the governance 
of  large  corporations.90 It  views  corporations  as  entities  which  serve  the  interests  of 
shareholders –as well as other interests, and is defined by a legal tradition which can be traced 
back to the 1920s.91
Two features which distinguish the German system of corporate governance from that of the 
US and the UK include:92 
- Less dispersed/Higher concentration of the ownership of large firms. In countries like the 
UK and the US where ownership is more dispersed, it is argued that “control is exerted 
by managers with considerable freedom to pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ 
expense – since their actions are not monitored adequately.”93 It is argued further that 
there is little incentive for individual shareholders to monitor since they are individually 
responsible for any accrued monitoring costs – even though such monitoring ultimately 
serves the benefit of all shareholders.94
- Involvement  of  banks  as  part  of  supervisory  boards  of  companies  (as  shareholder 
representatives).  This  allows  banks  to  monitor  the  management  of  companies  – 
particularly when a banker assumes the head of the supervisory board. The election of 
banks  to  the  supervisory  boards  of  companies  (as  shareholder  representatives  and 
sometimes as heads of supervisory boards), provides them with invaluable insight which 
facilitates their ability to monitor the management of companies.95
88 ibid at page 19 of 44
89 see ibid
90 See RH Schmidt „Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective” 2003 at page 2 of 44
91 ibid at page 3 of 44
92 J Edwards and M Nibler „Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of Banks and Ownership 
Concentration.“ 2000 Journal of Economic Policy 31: 237-260
93 ibid at pages 239 and 240
94 ibid
95 ibid at page 241; This being the case where a banker assumes the head of the supervisory board – owing to the 
fact that the chairman is frequently consulted by the management (usually on a monthly basis) – whilst the full 
board may hold meetings twice a year; ibid.
A further characteristic which distinguishes Germany from stock market economies exists in 
the way in which voting occurs at annual meetings.96 Whilst both stock market economies97 
and  universal  banking  systems98 share  the  common  feature  of  enabling  shareholders  to 
exercise control over management (through votes at general meetings), in Germany, banks 
also own their equity99 and “have proxy rights to vote the shares of other agents who keep 
their shares at the bank.”100 The importance of proxy voting rights stems from the fact that “it 
concentrates the voting power of dispersed household shareholders in the hands of banks – 
making them potentially powerful.”101 The influence of banks (with or without proxy voting 
rights) may have altered dramatically over the years owing to the different world of German 
corporate finance which currently persists.  Apart from the fact that security markets have 
become  more  developed  and  complex,  the  extent  of  banks’  block  holdings  has, 
correspondingly, also become very much reduced.102
Having considered the above features, it can be inferred that the inclusion of banks as part of 
the supervisory boards of companies, and less dispersed ownership of large firms have the 
benefits  of facilitating  higher  monitoring  levels.  However,  as observed by Schmidt,103 the 
Stock Corporation Act  (Aktiengesetz) accords to the management board  (Vorstand) a wide 
scope in the discharge of their powers. Furthermore, Edwards and Nibler argue that although 
banks may influence corporate governance through their control of proxy votes, their presence 
on supervisory boards, and their  provision of loan finance,  they do not play a role in the 
governance of large German firms in practice – that is, a role which is distinct from that of 
other  types  of  large  shareholders.104 They arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  “any case  for  the 
superiority of German corporate governance of large firms” must accordingly “be based on 
high ownership concentration rather than a special role for banks” – as well as a consideration 
of the costs of ownership concentration and its benefits.”105
The dual system of disclosure which exists in Germany should facilitate greater accountability 
and disclosure.  Furthermore,  it  should  reduce  the  scope  for  the  abuse of  powers  –  if  an 
adequate degree of independence existed within the supervisory board. In addressing how the 
present and more external control based system of corporate governance in Germany could 
respond to the criticisms of the “insider based system of control” as highlighted under the last 
paragraph of section H subsection (I), independence and objectivity would best be enhanced 
96 G Gorton and F Schmid, ‘Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms’ NBER Working Paper 
5453 1996 at page 1
97 Such as the UK and the US.
98 For instance, Germany.
99 As well as having the capacity to lend
100 ibid; Such right being referred to as Auftragsstimmrecht. The bank requests for permission to vote on behalf 
of the shareholder. Even though such a right is typically granted and lasts for about 15 months, it could still be 
revoked. Even though such a right has its limits, it enables banks to exercise a degree of influence on 
management irregardless of banks’ equity holdings in the firm; ibid.
101 ibid at page 2; Other ways through which banks could exert control over firms (even though such banks may 
appear to have insignificant equity holdings), include: i) “where the bank retains proxy rights – in addition to the 
votes attributed to their shares; (ii) where restrictions on voting (which prevents a block holder from exercising 
control) exists – such restrictions do not apply to bank proxy voting – giving banks unique power to the extent 
that they vote proxies; (iii) where block holders may have votes, but not enough information to use their power 
effectively – whilst banks, on the other hand, may have privileged information which they could use to their 
advantage – even if their holdings are small and even though a large block holder is present.” See ibid at page 10
102 See ibid at pages 30 and 31
103 RH Schmidt „Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective” 2003 at page 10 of 44
104J Edwards and M Nibler „Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of Banks and Ownership 
Concentration.“ 2000 Journal of Economic Policy 31 at 237; The scope of banks in influencing corporate 
governance “through an exercise of proxy votes and their representation on supervisory boards”, as further 
argued by Edwards and Nibler, “does not apply to all German firms.”
105 ibid
where the supervisory board were to be comprised of external independent experts such as 
bank managers or other qualified experts within the financial sector who also had the capacity 
to  curtail  excessive  powers  of  management  in  circumstances  where  such  management  is 
considered to have acted beyond the scope of its powers. 
Whilst  the weaknesses of an insider controlled system of corporate governance have been 
highlighted, it is also important to add that an insider controlled system serves as a valuable 
source of acquiring information and understanding about a firm or company – which could 
otherwise,  not  be  provided  by  an  external  expert.  Common  characteristics  which  audit 
committees and supervisory boards should ideally have, as revealed in a survey106 include: 
“That non executive directors have relevant industry experience; that some members should 
have sound grasp of current developments in financial markets; that there should be openness 
to regular training; that there should be distinct appointment policies and criteria; succession 
planning and membership criterion; that there should be clear delineation between their role 
and that of management; that there should be clear strategies for setting an appropriate control 
culture within their organisations; that there be regular, clearly structured meetings held at 
least  four times a year;  that  there  exist  regular  flow of relevant,  timely information  from 
company executives;  private meetings meeting internal and external audit leaders;  and the 
existence of self-assessment procedures.” 
Supervisory  boards  and  audit  committees  should  not  only  ensure  that  directors  and 
management are held accountable to shareholders, but also safeguard independence in matters 
related to the preparation, approval, audit of the financial statements. The Combined Code of 
Corporate  Governance provides  that  “the audit  committee  should consist  of  at  least  three 
independent  non-executive  directors107.  Furthermore,  the board should satisfy itself  that  at 
least  one  of  those  independent  non  executive  directors  has  recent  and  relevant  financial 
experience.”  Compliance  with  the  Code’s  recommendations  for  independence  requires  an 
exclusion of former finance directors and auditors from the board.108
I. Principles Based Regulation
This  section  illustrates  how  principle  based  regulation  could  be  employed  effectively  to 
mitigate  criticisms which are attributed  to principles  based regulation  – which include  its 
potential  to  impede  efforts  aimed  at  fostering  accountability  and  efficient  monitoring 
procedures. Such criticisms stem from the ability of “bright line rules”/rules based regulation 
to enhance clearer segregation of duties – which enhance accountability and delegation of 
monitoring procedures than an approach which is more inclined to principles base regulation. 
Despite its merits, “rules (and low level principles) should not be able to get in the way of 
what is really going on in the real business world.”109
A discretionary  based  approach  to  regulation,  whilst  encouraging  greater  possibilities  for 
regulatory capture, appears to be more congruent with principles based regulation. However it 
is  possible  to  implement  a  system  of  regulation  which  combines  increased  formalised 
procedures  and/or  detailed  rules  -  whilst  giving  due  consideration  to  the  substance  of 
transactions.
106 See V Beattie S Fearnely and R Brandt, Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About ICAEW 
2001 at page 29
107  „Or two if the company is not classified within the FTSE 350“
108 See „Combined Code on Corporate Governance“ <http://www.out-law.com/page-8219>
109D Kershaw, „Evading Enron: Taking Principles Too Seriously in Accounting Regulation“ (2005) 68 (4) 
Modern Law Review 594-625 at page 611.
“Principles provide the framework in which firms can organize their own processes to achieve 
the outcomes the regulator seeks – the regulator in turn depends on firms to adopt an attitude 
to the regulatory regime which is one which aims to go beyond minimal compliance with 
rules.”110
Principles based regulation is not only advantageous because it allows management of a bank 
or  firm  to  take  into  consideration  the  substance  of  transactions,  but  because  “principles 
impose outcomes to be achieved – not detailed processes for achieving them.”111 As well as 
being  linked  to  meta  regulation,  principles  based  regulation  facilitates  a  system whereby 
principles  “communicate  regulatory objectives  and promote  behaviour  which will  achieve 
those objectives.”112
Principles based regulation, thus, would not only reduce the scope for “creative compliance” – 
since the substance of transactions should be considered by management, but also has the 
benefit of providing a more flexible and responsive approach to regulation as this section will 
seek to demonstrate.
Principles based regulation is considered to comprise of 3 elements, namely:113
i) A particular type of rule
ii) A focus on outcomes and
iii) A  focus  on  senior  management  responsibility  in  ensuring  these  outcomes  are 
achieved
Furthermore,  three forms of principles  based regulation,  namely:  “formal  principles  based 
regulation; substantive principles based regulation and full principles based regulation”, have 
been suggested.114 For the purposes of this paper, the discussion will focus on substantive 
principles based regulation.
- Five classes of regulatory practices which could characterise substantive principles based 
regulation include:115 “The particular mode of interpretation- that is, the approach taken in the 
interpretative process; particular enforcement style; an orientation to outcomes; a relocation 
of responsibilities for working out the practical application of the provisions; and an explicit 
and developed reliance on management based regulation.”
The effectiveness of rules and regulation is dependent, not only on the monitoring processes 
and tools used in such processes, but also the effectiveness of the enforcement of those rules. 
For this reason focus will be dedicated to the second characteristic of substantive principles 
based  regulation  –  which  is  indeed  a  “critical”  and  defining  feature  of  principles  based 
regulation.
110  See J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 13/2008 (2008) at page 9 http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm  and 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstarct=1267722
111 ibid 
112 ibid at page 16
113 See J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 13/2008 (2008) at page 12
114 ibid
115 ibid at page 17
According to Black, the adoption of the “responsive” enforcement approach is justified on the 
basis that “neither negotiative approaches nor deterrence based approaches are effective on 
their  own and  that  instead,  regulators  should  implement  a  mixture  of  both,  that  is,  first 
negotiate,  then if  the firm still  does not deliver  substantive compliance,  regulators  should 
gradually move up the enforcement pyramid, applying sanctions of increasing severity until it 
does.”116 She adds weight to  Baldwin’s argument117 by stating that “those who know what 
they are meant to be doing and are generally inclined to do it (“the well intentioned and well 
informed”) , are best dealt with using a negotiating strategy – which is easier to do using 
principles. In contrast, those who do not know what they are meant to be doing and even if 
they did, would not be inclined to do it (“the ill intentioned and ill informed”), are best dealt 
with using a strategy that escalates rapidly up the enforcement pyramid.”118
This “responsive” approach,  it  is further argued, “is not contingent  on any particular  rule 
design and can operate in systems of i) highly detailed rules, ii) where the rules are mainly 
principles, iii) where there is a combination of both.”119
A system which consists of highly detailed “bright line rules” is advantageous both from the 
perspectives of fostering a higher degree of accountability and providing greater guidance in 
terms of compliance. This is very important in respect of junior management who have less 
experience with the interpretation of rules and who also require greater guidance in matters 
relating to compliance. The following paragraph not only highlights the weaknesses inherent 
in   principles  based  regulation,  but  also  illustrates  why  it  is  better  suited  for  senior 
management.
Having  considered  the  forms,  attributes  and  benefits  of  principles  based  regulation,  the 
weaknesses inherent in this type of regulation are worth mentioning. Firstly, in relation to the 
all  important  aim  of  ensuring  accountability  –  which  should  be  fostered  if  adequate 
monitoring procedures are observed and carried out by the responsible levels of authority. 
Principles based regulation could serve as a hindrance towards ensuring accountability. In this 
respect reference will be made to the seven paradoxes of principles based regulation – which 
are as follows:120
- “i)  The interpretative paradox :  Different  interpretations  attributed to principles  could 
result in imprecise and general terms being accorded very specific interpretations – even 
though  principles  are  supposed  to  offer  flexibility  (where  these  are  characterised  by 
imprecise terms).
- ii) The communicative paradox: Principles, whilst facilitating communication, could also 
hinder such communication. The paradox is attributed to the distinction between legal use 
of language and its ordinary use. 
116 See also I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992) Oxford University Press 
117 See R Baldwin, Rules and Government (1995) Oxford Clarendon Press
118 J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 13/2008 (2008) at page 19; She argues that “in a regime with a tough, punitive approach in which every 
infraction is met with a sanction, principles based regulation (PBR) would not survive – this being the case, 
because there is greater risk that firms will make the wrong assessment ie one with which the regulator does not 
agree.” Under principles based regulation, she argues further, “firms are required to think through the application 
of the provisions to particular situations to a far greater degree than they are with respect to a detailed rule – 
hence the higher probability that firms would make the wrong assessment .” See ibid at page 18
119 J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 13/2008 (2008) at page 19; It is further argued that “Different rule types make it easier for regulatory 
officials to deal with certain types of regulated firms.”
120  See ibid at pages 25 -35
- iii)  The compliance  paradox:  Principles  provide scope for  flexibility  in compliance  – 
however this could result in conservative and/or uniform behaviour by regulated firms.
- iv) The supervisory and enforcement paradox: Principles require enforcement to provide 
them with credibility – however over-enforcement could result in their demise.
- v) The internal  management  paradox:  Principles  based regulation has the potential  to 
offer required flexibility for internal control systems to develop – and also the potential to 
overload them.
- vi) Ethical paradox
- vii) Trust paradox
Based  on  their  level  of  professional  experience,  senior  management  should  have  less 
interpretational  difficulties  than  junior  and  less  qualified  employees.  For  these  reasons, 
principles are best implemented by qualified, experienced senior management who have held 
a reputable track record with a company. A combination of bright line rules and principles 
are favoured in relation to the choice between detailed rules, principles and a combination of 
both. The crucial question/s would be i) the point at which a departure from the systematic 
application of rules should occur – where such an application would render a consideration of 
the substance of transactions as infeasible. ii)The importance of efficiently communicating 
the need to switch from rules to principles – a function of senior management (which would 
be best achieved where a clear system for the delegation of responsibilities exists). However, 
the topic addressing these questions is beyond the scope of this paper.
A  detailed  consideration  of  the  paradoxes  of  principles  based  regulation  highlights  the 
importance of having a clear understanding of the form of principles based regulation which 
is applicable to a particular bank or business. As highlighted under the substantive principles 
based  regulation,  “those  who know what  they  are  meant  to  be  doing  and  are  generally 
inclined  to  do  it  (  the  well  intentioned  and  well  informed),  are  best  dealt  with  using  a 
negotiating strategy.” Hence a more draconian mode of enforcement, that is, the imposition 
of tougher sanctions, would not be best suited in facilitating compliance by such groups – 
such sanctions being better reserved for the “ill informed and ill intentioned.” Furthermore, a 
tough  punitive  regime  is  one  in  which  principles  are  unlikely  to  survive  –  even  though 
detailed rules could still be implemented under principles based regulation.121
Hence the level of compliance desired within a firm is best achieved having regard to the 
organisational structure which exists within an organisation – and to whether (as a result of a 
such  determination),  that  organisation  could  be  considered  a  suitable  candidate  for  the 
application of principles based regulation. Clear delegation and segregation of duties within 
an organisation would not only promote accountability,  but would also facilitate a system 
where principles could be applied and also facilitate monitoring procedures. Consequently, 
monitoring  would  also  facilitate  accountability  –  since  frequent  reviews  and  discussions 
between  management  and appropriate  personnel  should  increase  an  understanding  of  the 
activities carried out by particular divisions within the organisation.
J. CONCLUSION
Monitoring fosters transparency, which in turn fosters accountability. Monitoring of key risks, 
as well  as periodic  evaluations  by the business lines  and internal  audit  constitutes  a vital 
121  Refer to Formal Principles Based Regulation; ibid at page 12
element  of  corporate  governance  –  hence  the  overall  effectiveness  of  a  bank’s  internal 
controls should be monitored on an ongoing and frequent122 basis.123 
Since it is possible for detailed rules to operate under principles based regulation – and since 
detailed rules constitute a vital element in ensuring that clear delegation and segregation of 
responsibilities exist within an organisation, it could be said that the level of accountability 
derived  under  principles  based  regulation  is  dependent  on  the  form  of  principles  based 
regulation. Under the formal principles based regulation, the level of accountability derived is 
likely to be greater than that derived under full principles based regulation. As highlighted 
within  the  relevant  sections  of  this  paper,  an  approach  which  combines  negotiating  and 
punitive strategies is always considered best – owing to the level of flexibility offered by such 
an approach. However the organisational structure, culture and several other factors require 
consideration  before  substantive  principles  based  regulation  is  judged  to  be  the  optimal 
approach.
In accordance  with Principle  13 of  the  Principles  for  the  Assessment  of  Internal  Control 
Systems,  “supervisors  should  require  that  all  banks,  regardless  of  size,  have  an  effective 
system of internal controls that is consistent with the nature, complexity, and risk inherent in 
their on- and- off balance sheet activities and that corresponds to the bank’s environment and 
conditions.”  Furthermore,  “in  those  instances  where  supervisors  determine  that  a  bank’s 
internal control system is not adequate or effective for that bank’s specific risk profile, they 
should take  appropriate  action.”  In  accordance  with Core Principle  17 of  the Basel  Core 
Principles  for  Effective  Bank  Supervision,  Internal  controls  and  audit,  specific  attention 
should be given to ensure the existence of “clear arrangements for delegating authority and 
responsibility.” Indeed, a key to successfully implementing principles based regulation lies 
with  Core  Principle  17  –  which,  if  complied  with,  should  resolve  many  problems  and 
paradoxes associated with principles based regulation.
Where clear delegation of authority, segregation of responsibilities are not in place, the most 
appropriate and obvious action might be to initiate a more deterrence based approach – rather 
than a negotiative based approach. However, reference must be made to factors highlighted 
under the first paragraph of this conclusive section.
Increased formalisation under principles based regulation would still allow for a consideration 
of the substance of transactions – whilst allowing for flexibility in terms of its application. 
With  regards  to  its  application,  this  implies  its  suitability  as  the  appropriate  mode  of 
regulation - based on the level of accountability it  could provide an organisation with and 
whether an organisation, because of its structure and culture, should consider applying it at 
all.
122 “The frequency of monitoring different activities of a bank should be determined by considering the risks 
involved and the frequency and nature of changes occurring in the operating environment.” See Framework for 
Internal Control Systems  in Banking Organisations at page 20 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs40.pdf
123 See also Principle 10 of the Principles for the Assessment of Internal Control Systems; Framework for 
Internal Control Systems  in Banking Organisations at page 20 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs40.pdf. “Monitoring 
the effectiveness of internal controls could be undertaken by personnel from several different areas, including the 
business function itself, financial control and internal audit. For that reason, it is important that senior 
management clarify which personnel are responsible for which monitoring functions.” Further, “monitoring 
should constitute part of the daily activities of the bank – whilst including separate periodic evaluations of the 
overall internal control process. ”;ibid
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